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Abstract
Abilities of “smart systems” for processing information, adaptation to conditions of uncer-
tainty, and performance of scientifically proven preventive actions in real time are analyzed.
Basic probabilistic models and technologies for the analysis of complex systems, using
“smart systems,” ways of generation of probabilistic models for prognostic researches of
the new systems projected, modernized, or transformed, are proposed. The proposed
methods are described to predict risks to lose integrity for complex structures on the given
prognostic time and rationale of preventive measures considering admissible risk, estimate
“smart system” operation quality, and predict in real time the mean residual time before the
next parameter abnormalities. The methods and technologies are implemented on the level
of the remote monitoring systems. The application is illustrated on the examples of the joint-
stock company “Siberian Coal Energy Company.”
Keywords: analysis, method, model, prediction, probability, quality, risk, safety, smart
system, technology
1. Introduction
All next years and decades form an epoch of using smart systems. What about the usefulness
of smart systems for prediction and rationale of preventive measures against possible threats?
To answer this question, we address to some definitions.
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
According to ISO Guide 73, in general, case risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on
objectives. An effect is a deviation from the expected—positive and/or negative. Objectives
can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, and environmental goals) and
can be applied at different levels (such as strategic, organization-wide, project, product, and
process). Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events and consequences or a
combination of these. Risk may be estimated by a probability of potential events, leading to
effects considering consequences. The chapter, including examples, is focused on events lead-
ing to losses of system integrity (often with negative consequences). But it does not limit a
generality of proposed approaches.
According to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 “Systems and software engineering—System life cycle pro-
cesses,” a system is a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more
stated purposes. An enabling system is a system that supports a system of interest during its
life cycle stages but does not necessarily contribute directly to its function during operation. A
system of systems (SoS) is a system of interest whose elements are themselves systems. A SoS
brings together a set of systems for a task that none of the systems can accomplish on its own.
Each constituent system keeps its own management, goals, and resources while coordinating
within the SoS and adapting to meet SoS goals. The research covers systems defined in itself as
“smart” system or using “smart” systems (see Figure 1).
For modern or perspective system or for a system of systems from the point of view of
prediction and rationale of preventive measures against possible threats, the “smart” systems
are and will be used as the systems in itself or as system elements or enabling systems. In a
Figure 1. To the definition of “smart system” in a system.
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general case, “smart” is a mnemonic acronym, giving criteria to guide in the setting of objec-
tives, and “smart systems” are defined as miniaturized devices that incorporate functions of
sensing, actuation, and control (www.wikipedia.org, www.thefullwiki.org).
Developing existing researches [1–17], this manuscript includes correct probabilistic interpre-
tation of risk prediction effectively using “smart” systems, some original basic probabilistic
models for risk prediction, the improvement of existing risk control concept, and approaches
for solving some problems of industrial safety for coal branch.
2. Probabilistic interpretation of risk prediction for effective using
“smart” systems
Because “smart” possibilities allow to forecast a future, we should view probabilistic vision of
event prediction, its scientific interpretation, and, unfortunately, some existing illusory vision.
Here, from the scientific point of view for anticipating dangerous development of events, it is
difficult to construct an adequate probability distribution function (PDF) [1–4] of time between
losses of system integrity. Damage may be to some extent estimated on practice (we will
consider that the deviations in estimations can reach 100%). Therefore, leaving an estimation
of a possible damage out of the work, we will stop on researches of a probabilistic component
of risk. What deviations in risk predictions are possible here? To answer this question, it is
necessary to understand typical metrics and engineering methods of risk predictions, in defi-
nition and concept to use “admissible risk,” and then to compare various variants.
In practice probabilistic estimations of system integrity losses are quite often carried out by the
frequency of emergencies or any adverse events. For example, with reference to safety, it can be
frequencies of different danger threats influences, leading to a damage. That is, frequency
replaces estimations of probability (risk to lose integrity of system during prognostic period). It
is correct? From probability theory it is known that for defined PDF one of its characteristics is
the mathematical expectation (Texp.). In turn, for PDF of time between losses of system integrity,
the mathematical expectation is the mean time between neighboring losses of system integrity
Texp., and moreover the frequency λ of system integrity losses is equal to 1/Texp. If to be guided
only by frequency λ (with ignoring PDF) in practice, a large deviation may take place. Indeed, a
probability that event has occurred till moment Texp. can be equal to 0.00 for approximation by
deterministic (discrete) PDF and 0.36 for exponential approximation (see Figure 2). That is, as a
result of erroneous choice of PDF, characterized by identical λ, the enormous difference may
take place! On the one hand, it means ambiguity of a probabilistic estimation of events, being
guided only on frequency λ, and on the other hand, a necessity of search (or creations) of more
adequate PDF of time between losses of system integrity is very high.
Often today, engineers prefer exponential PDF: R(t, λ) = 1 – exp. (λ∙t). If, for example, for
1 year of prognostic period to put λ about 103 times in a year or less, then under Taylor’s
expansion R(t, λ) ≈ λ∙t with accuracy o(λ2∙t2). And, if t = 1 year, the absolute value of frequency
practically coincides with the value of probability. But if value λ∙t increases, it is capable to
exceed 1 and by definition generally cannot be perceived as probability. Resume: focusing on
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probability is correct from the point of view of universal risk metric. And, focusing on fre-
quency may be incorrect if λ∙t is approximately more than 103.
The special importance has the concept of “admissible risk.” The matter is that there should be a
result of the consent of all parties involved in unsafe business on condition that it does not ruin
business; by all it is unequivocally estimated and interpreted (not excluding emergencies) and is
scientifically proven. In practice frequently the “admissible risk” is interpreted as “border strip,”
i.e., it is supposed that if it does not cross this “border strip,” the system integrity cannot be lost.
But in reality it is not so! The residual risk always remains. In operation research the similar
restrictions are considered as a starting point for the decision of synthesis problems, connected
with searching effective preventive measures of system integrity in life cycle. The complex use of
these measures promotes in retaining the risk on the admissible level. It is the typical approach
which should work correctly. And how does it work in practice?
Here, it is to quite pertinently address the developed form of the quantitative requirements,
connected with the level of admissible risks. The elementary forms of requirements are:
• “A frequency λ of system integrity losses should not exceed admissible level λadm.”
• “Probability to lose integrity of system during time Treq should not exceed admissible
level Radm. (Treq).”
• Their combination.
What engineering explanations occur in practice? They are as follows:
• If the limitation on the admissible level of probability Radm. (Treq) is set, it means that
crossing “border strip” should not occur on an interval of time from 0 to Treq. For
exponential approximations there is an unequivocal functional dependence: λadm. =  ln
(1- Radm. (Treq)). That is, this dependence means that a given value of admissible probabil-
ity Radm. (Treq) corresponds unequivocally with a value of the maximum frequency of
system integrity losses.
Figure 2. For the same λ, a probability that event has occurred can be equal to 0.00 for approximation by deterministic
PDF and 0.36 for exponential PDF approximation.
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• If the limitation on the admissible level of maximum frequency of system integrity losses
λadm. is set, it means that for exponential approximations the function of probability from
time t is considered: R(t, λadm.) = 1 – exp. (λadm.∙t). That is, this is the same “border strip”
but in the form of the function from t and without an obvious binding to value Treq. This
level of limitation by function Radm. (Treq) is logically to interpret also as “admissible” for
the period of time from 0 to t. Admissible risk in the point of probability Padm. (treq.) for
time treq. May be prolonged on the level of PDF by exponential distribution and the
admissible frequency of system integrity losses λ =  ln(1- Рadm. (treq.)). It is convenient,
but is it adequate? In reality a vision about exponential PDF for behavior of “smart”
system may be roughly erroneous (see Figure 3).
Despite obvious incompleteness of the elementary forms of requirements to “admissible risks”
(in reality, only the limitations in one or several points) and the absence of interrelations with a
kind of real PDF of time between losses of system integrity (depending frommany parameters:
structure of system, heterogeneity of threats, different measures of counteraction to threats,
etc.), these forms have got accepted by engineering community. In the further statement of the
work, wewill be guided by these elementary forms of requirements to “admissible risks.” They
also allow to extract latent knowledge from the results of adequate probabilistic modeling.
Today, specifications of safety in different fields characterize a frequency λ of system integrity
losses at the level 103–107 times a year. As a matter of fact, it is one danger event for 1000 years,
i.e., cannot be tested in system life! In practice it can be estimated bymeans of mathematical and/
or physical modeling. And, from statistics we know only that at the Russian systems of oil and
gas industry, thousand emergencies are annually. But, the number of incidents with a compre-
hensible result (with prevented emergencies) is usually a hundred times more!
Accordingly, there is an important question: what frequencies of system integrity losses should
be used for risk predictions and where does it take? If these are only the frequencies of emergen-
cies, the predicted risks will be essentially underestimated! These final frequencies are output
Figure 3. About erroneous vision of exponential PDF approximation instead of more adequate approximation.
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instead of input data for modeling. Estimate, please: if to be guided by these frequencies and to
consider that 50–70% of failures are the result of “human factor,” it should mean that the
frequency of critical errors from “human factor” on systems is about one time in thousand years!
However, that is not so in real life! Errors are committed much more often. But they are under
control, and the majority of them is in due time corrected. As consequence of these counteraction
measures, required system integrity (including safety) is reached. The answer arises obviously:
the frequency λ of system integrity losses used at risk predictions itself should pay off by the
results of probabilistic modeling. Indeed, for adequate risk prediction, there is an important
frequency of all the primary incidents (including neutralized incidents at the expense of control
measures, maintenance, and timely reaction on initial signs of threat development).
Consideration of “smart” system possibilities for proactive diagnostics of system integrity,
monitoring of conditions, and recovering the lost integrity allows to create more adequate
Figure 4. The possible variants of correlations of the limitations to admissible risks, exponential, and an adequate PDF of
time between losses of system integrity with identical frequency of system integrity losses λ.
Figure 5. All requirements to admissible risk are met for an adequate PDF of time between losses of system integrity.
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PDF for risk predictions. In Figure 4 the limitations to admissible risks, fragment of exponen-
tial, and an adequate PDF of time between losses of system integrity with identical frequency
of system integrity losses are demonstrated. The errors in comparison with vision in Figure 3
are noted.
An example when all requirements to admissible risk are met is presented on Figure 5. It is the
right understanding of probabilistic vision of event prediction with scientific interpretation
considering situations in Figure 4.
3. Some basic probabilistic models for risk prediction
Considering possibilities of “smart” systems, two general technologies of providing protection
in different spheres are described: proactive periodical diagnostics of system integrity (tech-
nology 1) and additionally monitoring between diagnostics (technology 2) including recovery
of integrity [2–3, 6–10]. These models allow to create more adequate PDF of time before the
next event of the lost integrity.
3.1. The models for the systems that are presented as one element (“black box”)
Technology 1 is based on proactive diagnostics of system integrity that are carried out period-
ically to detect danger occurrences into a system or consequences of negative influences. The
lost system integrity can be detected only as a result of diagnostics, after which the recovery of
integrity is started. Dangerous influence on system is acted step by step: at first a danger
occurrence into a system and then after its activation begins to influence. System integrity
cannot be lost before an occurred danger is activated. A danger is considered to be realized
only after a danger has activated and influenced on a system. Otherwise, the danger will be
detected and neutralized during the next diagnostic.
Note: it is supposed that used diagnostic tools allow to provide system integrity recovery
after revealing of danger occurrences into a system or consequences of influences.
Technology 2, unlike the previous one, implies that operators alternating each other trace
system integrity between diagnostics. In case of detecting a danger, an operator recovers
system integrity (ways of dangers removing and system recovery are the same as for technol-
ogy 1). Faultless operator’s actions provide a neutralization of a danger. When a complex
diagnostic is periodically performed, this time operators are alternated. An occurrence of a
danger is possible only if an operator makes an error, but a dangerous influence occurs if the
danger is activated before the next diagnostic.
The probability of system operation with required safety and quality within the given
prognostic period (i.e., probability of success) may be estimated as a result of using the next
models for technologies 1 and 2. Assumption: for all time input characteristic, the probability
distribution functions exist. Risk R(Treq) to lose integrity (safety, quality, or separate property,
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e.g., reliability), i.e., to be though one time in “red” range during period Treq, is addition to 1
for probability P(Treq) of providing system integrity (“probability of success,” i.e., to be in
“green” or “yellow” ranges all period Treq). R(Treq) =1-P(Treq) considering consequences.
The next variants for technologies 1 and 2 are possible: variant 1—the given prognostic period
Treq is less than established period between neighboring diagnostics (Treq < Tbetw. + Tdiag);
variant 2—the prognostic period Treq is more than or equals to established period between
neighboring diagnostics (Treq ≥ Tbetw. + Tdiag). Here, Tbetw. is the time between the end of
diagnostic and the beginning of the next diagnostic, and Tdiag is the diagnostic time.
The next formulas for PDF of time between the losses of system integrity are proposed [2–3].
PDF for the model of technology 1 (variant 1): Under the condition of independence for character-
istics, the probability of providing system integrity for variant 1 is equal to






where Ωoccur(t) is the PDF of time between neighboring occurrences of danger (from the
“green” to the “yellow” range), mathematical expectation Toccur = σ
1; Ωactiv(t) is the PDF of
activation time of occurred danger (threat: from the first input at the “yellow” range to the first
input in the “red” range), and mathematical expectation is β. The PDF Ωoccur(t) and Ωactiv(t)
may be exponential (see rationale in [6]). For different threats a frequency of dangers for these
PDF is the sum of frequencies of every kind of threats.
PDF for the model of technology 1 (variant 2): Under the condition of independence for character-
istics, the probability of providing system integrity for variant 2 is equal to
ð2Þ
where N = [Тreq./(Тbetw. + Тdiag.)] may be real (for PDF) or the integer part (for estimation of
deviations).
Trmn ¼ Treq N Tbetw þ Tdiag
 
:
The probability of providing system integrity within the given time P(1)(Tgiven) is defined by
Eq. (1).
PDF for the model of technology 2 (variant 1): Under the condition of independence for character-
istics, the probability of providing system integrity for variant 1 is equal to
ð3Þ
Here, A(τ) is the PDF of time between operator’s errors. A(τ) may be exponential PDF (see
rationale in [6]).
PDF for the model of technology 2 (variant 2): Under the condition of independence of character-
istics, the probability of providing system integrity for variant 2 is equal to
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ð4Þ
where the probability of providing system integrity within the given time P(1)(Treq.) is defined
by Eq. (3).
The final clear analytical formulas for modeling are received by Lebesgue integration of
expression (3).
The models are applicable to the system presented as one element. The main result of such
system modeling is a probability of providing system integrity or of losses of system integrity
during the given period of time. If a probability for all points Тreq. from 0 to ∞ will be
calculated, a trajectory of the PDF for each combined element depending on threats, periodic
control, monitoring, and recovery time is automatically synthesized.
3.2. Probabilistic approach to estimate “smart” system operation quality
In general case “smart” system operation always aims to provide reliable and timely produc-
ing the complete, valid and, if needed, confidential information for its proper further prag-
matic use, including incorporate functions of sensing, actuation, and control. And, potential
threats to “smart” system operation are influencing the used information (Figure 6).
In general case a probabilistic space (Ω, B, P) for an evaluation of system operation processes is
proposed, whereΩ is the limited space of elementary events; B is the class of all subspace ofΩ
space, satisfied to the properties of σ-algebra; and P is the probability measure on a space of
elementary events Ω. Because Ω = {ωk} is limited, there is enough to establish a reflection
ωk ! pk = P(ωk) like that pk ≥ 0 and
P
kpk ¼ 1. Such space (Ω, B, P) is built [6] and proposed
for use because “smart” system may be considered as specially focused information system,
incorporating functions of sensing, actuation, and control. The proposed analytical models and
calculated measures are as follows [6]:
“The model of function performance by a complex system in conditions of unreliability of its
components” (the measures: TMTBF is the mean time between failures; Prel.(Тgiven) is the prob-
ability of reliable operation of IS, composed by subsystems and system elements, during the
Figure 6. Potential threat realization to “smart” system operation on the level of used information.
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given period Тgiven; and Pman(Тgiven) is the probability of providing faultless man’s actions
during the given period Тgiven).
“The model complex of call processing” (the measures for the different dispatcher technologies
(for unpriority call processing in a consecutive order for single-tasking processing mode, in a
time-sharing order for multitasking processing mode; for priority technologies of consecutive
call processing with relative and absolute priorities; for batch call processing; for combination
of technologies above): the mean wait time in a queue; the mean full processing time, including
the wait time; Ptim is the probability of well-timed processing during the given time; the
relative portion of all well-timed processed calls; the relative portion of well-timed processed
calls of those types for which the customer requirements are met Ctim).
“The model of entering into IS current data concerning new objects of application domain”
(the measure: Pcompl is the probability that IS contains complete current information about the
states of all objects and events).
“The model of information gathering” (the measure: Pactual. is the probability of IS information
actuality on the moment of its use).
“The model of information analysis” (the measures: Pcheck is the probability of error absence
after checking; the fraction of errors in information after checking; Pprocess is the probability of
correct analysis results obtained; the fraction of unaccounted essential information).
“The model complex of dangerous influences on a protected system” (the measures: Pinf.l.(Тgiven)
is the probability of required counteraction to dangerous influences from threats during the
given period Тgiven).
“The model complex of an authorized access to system resources” (the measures: Pprot is the
probability of providing system protection from an unauthorized access by means of barriers;
Pconf. (Тgiven) is the probability of providing information confidentiality by means of all barriers
during the given period Тgiven).
These models, supported by different versions of software Complex for Evaluation of Infor-
mation Systems Operation Quality, patented by Rospatent№2,000,610,272 (CEISOQ+), may be
applied and improved for solving such system problems in “smart” system life cycle as
rationale of quantitative system requirements to hardware, software, users, staff, and technol-
ogies; requirement analysis; estimation of project engineering decisions and possible danger;
detection of bottlenecks; investigation of problems concerning potential threats to system
operation and information security; testing, verification, and validation of “smart” system
operation quality; rational optimization of “smart” system technological parameters; and
rationale of projects and directions for effective system improvement and development.
3.3. The generation of new models for complex systems
The basic ideas of correct integration of probabilistic metrics are based on a combination and
development of the offered models [2–3, 6–10]. For a complex system estimation with parallel
or serial structure, new models can be generated by methods of probability theory. For this
Probabilistic Modeling in System Engineering32
purpose in analogy with reliability, it is necessary to know a mean time between losses of
integrity for each element. Let’s consider the elementary structure from two independent
parallel elements that means logic connection “OR” or series elements that means logic con-
nection “AND” (see Figure 7).
The PDF of time between neighboring losses of ith element integrity is Вi(t) = Р (τi ≤ t); then:
(1) Time between losses of integrity for system combined from series connected independent
elements is equal to a minimum from two times τi: failure of the first or second elements (i.e.,
the system goes into a state of lost integrity when either the first or second element integrity
will be lost). For this case the PDF of time between losses of system integrity is defined by
expression
ð5Þ
(2) Time between losses of integrity for system combined from parallel connected independent
elements (hot reservation) is equal to a maximum from two times τi: failure of the first or
second elements (i.e., the system goes into a state of lost integrity when both the first and
second element integrity will be lost). For this case the PDF of time between losses of system
integrity is defined by expression
ð6Þ
Note: The same approach is studied also by Prof. E. Ventcel (Russia) in 80th who has formu-
lated the trying tasks for students.
Thus, an adequacy of probabilistic models is reached by the consideration of real processes of
control, monitoring, and element recovery for complex structure. Applying recurrently expres-
sions (5)–(6), it is possible to create PDF of time between losses of integrity for any complex
system with parallel and/or series structure.
The known kind of the more adequate PDF allows to define accordingly mean time between
neighboring losses of system integrity Texp. (may be calculated from this PDF as mathematical
expectation) and a frequency λ of system integrity losses λ = 1/ Texp..
Risk to lose integrity (safety, quality, or separate property, e.g., reliability) is an addition to 1 for
probability of providing system integrity (correct system operation or “probability of success”)
R = 1P. The formulas for probabilistic modeling technologies 1 and 2 and the proofs of them
are proposed in [2–3, 6].
All these ideas are implemented by the software technologies of risk prediction for complex
systems, for example, the “mathematical modeling of system life cycle processes,” “know-how”
Figure 7. Illustration of system, combined from series (left) or parallel (right) elements.
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(registered by Rospatent №2,004,610,858), and “complex for evaluating quality of production
processes” (patented by Rospatent№2,010,614,145) [8–9].
4. The improvement of existing risk control concept
The purposed approach to improve existing risk control concept includes (see Figure 8) [11–17]:
• Creation and perfection of probabilistic models for problem decision
• Automatic combination and generation of new probabilistic models
• Forming the storehouse of risk prediction knowledge
• For storehouse, dozens of variants of the decision of typical industrial problems for risk
control
For example, system, combined from complex interested system and “smart” system (also it
may be SoS), can be analyzed by the formula (5) and probabilistic models described above (see
Figure 9). The correct operation of this system of system during the given period means during
the given period of prediction both the first and the second complex systems should operate
correctly according their destinations. That is, integrated system is in the state “Integrity
(correct operation)” if “AND” the interested system left and “AND” the “smart” system right
are in the state “Integrity (correct operation).”
Thus, the proposed improved that risk control concept can be useful to perform effectively
functions: risk prediction; rationale of quantitative system requirements to hardware, software,
users, staff, and technologies; requirement analysis; estimation of project engineering decisions
and possible danger; detection of bottlenecks; investigation of problems concerning potential
threats to operation of complex systems; validation of system operation quality; rational
optimization of system parameters; and rationale of plans, projects, and directions for effective
system utilization, improvement, and development. The expected pragmatic effect is as fol-
lows: it is possible to provide essential system quality and safety rise and/or avoid wasted
expenses in system life cycle bases on the rational application of improved concept.
Figure 8. The purposed approach to improve existing risk control concept.
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5. About some problems of industrial safety for coal branch
As an example of effectively solving the problems of industrial safety, we consider an experi-
ence of the joint-stock company “Siberian Coal Energy Company (SUEK)” (see www.suek.
com). SUEK is one of the world’s largest coal companies with production assets in Russia and
a global trading network. SUEK delivers long-term value to shareholders at every stage of the
value chain—mining, processing, transportation, and shipment—through port facilities, sales,
and distribution (Figure 10). This value chain includes different SoS. In practice many SoS of
SUEK use “smart” systems [11, 14].
Below are the aspects researched:
• Probabilistic analysis of the remote monitoring system (RMS) possibilities for increasing
industrial safety of critical infrastructure safety (CIS).
• Estimating in real time the mean residual time before the next parameter abnormalities
considering the results of the control of equipment and technological process conformity
to the set normative in real time.
5.1. Probabilistic analysis of the remote monitoring system possibilities
For coal branch the developments of mine, buildings, and constructions should be equipped
by a complex of systems and means that provide the organization and implementation of coal
Figure 9. System of two different complex systems (serial combination) for modeling integrated system.
Figure 10. The SUEK value chain includes “smart” systems everywhere.
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work safety and technological and productions control in normal and emergency conditions.
This complex of systems and means should be integrated into multifunctional safety system
(MFSS) with the following main functions:
• Monitoring and prevention of conditions of occurrence of geodynamic, aerologic, and
technogenic danger.
• The control of technological process conformity to the set normative in real time.
• Application of counteremergency protection systems.
The usual approaches to critical infrastructure safety (CIS) which have been developed in last
dozen years, based on many respects on subjective safety estimations “on places”, have
reached a high but not sufficient level of efficiency. For the account of interests of all interested
parties and the further business development today, rethinking system possibilities of applied
information technologies for increasing safety and extracting the innovative effects are not
used fully till now.
Search of cardinal directions of improving CIS, favorable to business and the state, has led to
comprehension of sharp necessity and expediency of creation and implementation of remote
monitoring system (RMS) that is an important part of MFSS. RMS transforms an internal
information support of separate CIS in a mode of a needed transparency and wide availability
of CIS state in real time for all interested and responsible parties. Along with it on the basis of
rational RMS implementation, the transition from the existing subjective expert approach to
the risk-based approach for critical infrastructure safety receives necessary information filling.
The proposed probabilistic analysis of RMS operation in their influence on integral risks to lose
system integrity is based on researching real remote monitoring systems implemented in
Russia for oil and gas CIS. In application to composed and integrated CIS with RMS and
without RMS, the earlier models, developed by authors, are used [1–10]. The received results
are applicable for an analytical rationale of system requirements to RMS, system definition of
the balanced preventive measures of systems, and subsystem and element integrity support at
limitations on resources and admissible risks.
Requirements to monitoring and prognosis for critical systems are established at the level of
many international standards, for example, ISO 17359, ISO 13381–1, ISO 13379, IEC 61508–1
[18–21], etc. Today, a monitoring of parameter conditions is carried out to increase reliability
and industrial safety of critical systems, improve their health management, and provide pre-
dictive maintenance and operation efficiency. Here, critical systems are understood as objects
of dangerous manufacture and the equipment, energy objects, power and transport systems,
and others. Different data about current conditions of parameters become accessible in real
time. So, for coal mine some of many dozens of heterogeneous parameters are for ventilation
equipment (VE) (temperature of rotor and engine bearings, a current on phases, and voltage of
stator) and for modular decontamination equipment (MDE) (vacuum in the pipeline, the
expense and temperature of a metano-air mix in the pipeline before equipment, pressure in
system of compressed air, etc.). Effects from RMSmay be reached on the basis of gathering and
analytical processing in real time the information on controllable parameters of objects moni-
tored (see Figure 11). RMS is intended for a possibility of prediction, the prevention of possible
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emergencies, minimization of a role of human factor regarding control, and supervising func-
tions. The role of RMS is defined by their functions, to the basic of which concern:
• Remote continuous monitoring of CIS condition in real time (gathering data about key
parameters of technological processes; gathering and processing data of industrial inspec-
tion, the information of technical condition and equipment diagnostics, and the informa-
tion on the presence of failures and incidents; and results of system recovery, etc.)
• Analytical data processing
• Prediction of risks to lose object integrity
• Display of parameter conditions and predictions with the necessary level of details
In this subsection analytical decomposition and the subsequent integration of complex systems
are used according to propositions above in Sections 1–4. Admissible conditions (ranges) of
traced parameters for each element, the reservation possibilities, implemented technologies of
the control, and recovery of integrity are considered.
RMS is intended for a possibility of prediction, the prevention of possible emergencies, mini-
mization of a role of human factor regarding control, and supervising functions. It may be
reached on the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on
controllable parameters of objects monitored. For example, objects monitored for oil and gas
CIS are the technological equipment and processes of extraction, transportation, refining, the
personnel, systems, and means of safety support.
Figure 11. Example of reaction in real time.
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The role of RMS is defined by their functions, to the basic of which concern:
• Remote continuous monitoring of CIS condition in real time (gathering data about key
parameters of technological processes; gathering and processing data of industrial inspec-
tion, the information of technical condition and equipment diagnostics, and the informa-
tion on the presence of failures and incidents; and results of system recovery, etc.)
• Analytical data processing
• Prediction of risks to lose CIS integrity
• Display of CIS conditions and predictions with the necessary level of details
Unlike the usual control which is carried out at enterprises (when the state supervising body in
the field of industrial safety and frequently also the enterprise/holding bodies of the industrial
safety control receive the information only upon incident or failure, not possessing the actual
information about deviations at an initial stage when still it is possible to prevent failure), RMS
translates the control, a transparency of CIS conditions, the important real-time information
(about the facts and predictions), and also necessity of proper response to critical deviations for
absolutely new time scale characterized as the scale of real time, measured by seconds-
minutes.
Effects from the remote control can be reached only when quality of RMS operation is pro-
vided. It means that it is reliable and timely producing the complete, valid, and, if needed,
confidential information by RMS.
Generally, system analysis of RMS operation consists in evaluation of reliability, timeliness,
completeness, validity, and confidentiality of the used information. In special cases for com-
pound subsystems and system elements, not all measures may be used. For example, for a
subsystem of information security enough to use the measures to evaluate protection from an
unauthorized access and information confidentiality during the given time period. Depen-
dence of the purposes of researching RMS can be decomposed to the level of compound
subsystems and separate elements (see Figure 6).
In this case according to the system engineering principles, the operation quality of every
component should be evaluated.
For evaluating integral RMS operation quality, the next measure is proposed: the probability of
providing reliable and timely representation of the complete, valid, and confidential informa-
tion during the given time (РRMS(Тgiven)).
In general case
where all measures are calculated by the models proposed in Section 2.
For complex structures the ideas of combination of the models is proposed in [15]. It allows in
an automatic mode to generate new models at the expense that there is possible evaluation of
the measures above.
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When not all system elements and subsystems are captured by RMS capabilities, two sub-
systems, operated in different time scales, are cooperated in the CIS. A part of CIS, captured
RMS, is served in real time, and the other part is in a usual time scale (with information
gathering by a principle “as it is possible to receive”). In many critical situations, this usual
time scale cannot be characterized as adequate to a reality. With the use of the offered
approach, the system with usual control (UC), used for CIS, i.e., without RMS application,
can be estimated. Generally, the analyzed critical infrastructure is presented as a combination
“System+RMS” and usual “System without RMS.” And, “System+RMS” is a combination of
“Structure for RMS” and “RMS” (see Figure 12). For these systems some measures of the
information delivery may not answer requirements of real time—“System+RMS” because
RMS operation quality is inadequate and “System without RMS” without RMS.
All the great number of the factors characterizing threats to analyzed critical infrastructure is
considered as 100%, and total frequency of dangerous deviations is designated through λ∑.
Frequency of potentially dangerous deviations traced by “System + RMS” is designated
(λRMS). Frequency of occurrence of other potentially dangerous deviations which are not
traced by RMS (i.e., for “System without RMS”) is designated (λ∑  λRMS).
For “System + RMS” the RMS operation quality during the time of prediction Тgiven is evalu-
ated by probability РRMS(Тgiven). And, the risk of critical deviation for safety during the time of
prediction Тgiven, designated as RRMS(Тgiven), can be evaluated by the earlier methods [2–3,
5–17]. For the usual “System without RMS,” the same measures РUC(Тgiven) and RUC(Тgiven)
can be used with specified value of input for probabilistic modeling.
Then, in general form, the risk R(Тgiven) to lose integrity for analyzed critical infrastructure
during the time of prediction Тgiven can be evaluated by the formula:
Figure 12. Decomposition of analyzed critical infrastructure to fill influence of RMS.
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where expression in square brackets is a probability of successful operation of analyzed critical
infrastructure. Depending on the made risk definition in special cases, it can be interpreted as
probability of safe or reliable operation or probability of norm observance for critical parame-
ters of the equipment or others in the conditions of associated potential threats. The case
λ∑ = λRMS means full capture of critical infrastructure by RMS capabilities.
5.2. Estimating the mean residual time before the next parameter abnormalities
Unfortunately, in the world the universal approach to adequate prognosis of the future param-
eter conditions on the basis of current data is not created yet. The uncertainty level is too high.
Nevertheless, in practice for each concrete case, subjective expert estimations, regression anal-
ysis of collected data, and simulation are often used. And, probabilistic models applied in
some cases contain many simplifications, and they frequently do not consider an infrastructure
of complex systems, heterogeneity of threats, distinctions in technologies of the control, and
recovery of integrity for various elements of these systems [2–3]. The same aspects and also
rarity of many random events (with some exceptions) do an ineffective statistical estimation of
residual time before the next parameter abnormalities. At the same time, scientifically proven
prognosis of a residual time resources is necessary for acceptance of preventive measures on
timely elimination of the abnormality reasons. The above-stated characterizes an actuality of
this and similar researches for different industrial areas [11–17].
Traced conditions of parameters are data about a condition before and on the current moment
of time, but always the future is more important for all. With the use of current data, respon-
sible staff (mechanics, technologists, engineers, etc.) should know about admissible time for
work performance to maintain system operation. Otherwise, because of ignorance of a residual
time resource before abnormality, the necessary works are not carried out. That is, because of
ignorance of this residual time, measures for prevention of negative events after parameter
abnormalities (failures, accidents, damages, and/or the missed benefit because of equipment
time out) are not undertaken. And, on the contrary, knowing residual time before abnormality,
these events may be avoided, or the system may be maintained accordingly. For monitored
critical system, the probabilistic method to estimate the mean residual time before the next
parameter abnormalities for each element and whole system is proposed.
By principles of system engineering (e.g., according to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288), the complex
system is decomposed to compound subsystems and elements with formal definition of states
(see Figure 13).
For every valuable subsystem (element), monitored parameters are chosen, and for each
parameter, the ranges of possible values of conditions are established: “In working limits,”
“Out of working range, but inside of norm,” and “Abnormality” (interpreted similarly light
signals (“green,” “yellow,” “red”) (see Figure 14). The condition “Abnormality” characterizes a
threat to lose system integrity (on the logic level, this range “Abnormality” may be interpreted
analytically as failure, fault, unacceptable risk or quality, etc.).
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For avoiding the possible crossing of a border of “Abnormality,” a prediction of residual time,
which is available for preventive measures, according to gathered data about parameter
condition fluctuations considering ranges, should be carried out. For prediction the following
are proposed: (1) a choice of probabilistic models for construction (PDF of time before the next
abnormality for one element (“black box”)), (2) development of the algorithm of generation
(PDF of time before the next abnormality for complex system), and 3) formalization of
calculative methods of estimating the mean residual time before the next parameter abnormal-
ities for monitored critical system.
The method allows to estimate residual time before the next parameter abnormality (i.e., time
before the first next coming into “red” range) [14].
The method allows to estimate residual time before the next parameter abnormality Tresid(1) for a
given admissible risk Radm.(Treq) to lose integrity. The estimated Tresid(1) is the solution t0 of equation:
ð7Þ
concerning of unknown parameter t, i.e., Tresid(1) = t0.
Here, R(Toccur, t, Tbetw, Tdiag, Тerr., Treq.) is the risk to lose integrity; it is addition to 1 for
probability P(Treq) of providing system integrity (“probability of success”), and for calculations
formulas (1)–(7) are used (see SubSection 3.1 of this article). So, for exponential PDF, formula
(1) transforms into formula.
Figure 13. Example of system decomposition.
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This formula is used for Eq. (7).
Toccur is the mathematical expectation of PDF Ωoccur (τ); it is defined by parameter statistics of
transition from “green” into “yellow” range (see Figure 3). The other parameters Tbetw and
Tdiag in formula (7) are known. The main practical questions are as follows: what about Treq.
and what about the given admissible risk Radm.(Treq)? For answering we can use the properties
of function R(Toccur, t, Tbetw, Tdiag, Тerr., Treq.):
• If parameter t increases from 0 to∞ for the same another parameters, the function R(…, t,…)
is monotonously decreasing from 1 to 0, i.e., if the mean activation time of occurred danger
(threat: from the first input at the “yellow” range to the first input in the “red” range) is
bigger, to lose integrity is less.
• If parameter Treq increases from 0 to ∞ for the same other parameters, the function R(…,Treq)
is monotonously increasing from 0 to 1, i.e., for large Treq risk approaches to 1.
It means that the such maximal x exists when t = x and Treq. = x and 0 < R(Toccur, x, Tbetw, Tdiag,
Тerr., x) < 1. That is, the residual time before the next parameter abnormality (i.e., time before
the first next coming into “red” range) is equal to the defined x with the confidence level of
admissible risk R(Toccur, x, Tbetw, Tdiag, Тerr., x).
For example, if Toccur = 100, Tbetw = 8 hours, Tdiag = 1 hour, Тerr. = 0, and Radm. = 0.05, unknown x
is defined from equation, considering (1), (7):
So, if Toccur = 100 days, for Radm. = 0.01 residual time x ≈ 2.96 weeks (considering decisions of
recovery problems of integrity every 8 hours).
Figure 14. Elementary ranges for parameter conditions.
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The method is implemented by RMS. At once after crossing “yellow” border from “green,” the
automatic prediction of the mean residual time before the next parameter abnormalities (from
the first input at the “yellow” range to the first input in the “red” range) is displayed (see
Figure 15).
Adequate reaction of responsible staff in real time is transparent for all interested parties.
5.3. About some effects from adequate probabilistic methods and technology applications
Some effects from the proposed adequate probabilistic methods and technologies of RMS are
estimated on the level of predicting risks to lose object safety (integrity) by PDF [16].
Example 5.3.1. According to statistics from multifunctional safety system (MFSS), a frequency
of occurrence of the latent or obvious threats is equal to once a month, and an average time of
development of threats (from occurrence of the first signs of a critical situation up to failure) is
about 1 day. A work shift is equal to 8 hours. The system control is used once for work shift,
and a mean duration of the system control is about 10 minutes (it is supposed that recovery of
object integrity is expected also for 10 minutes). The workers (they may be mechanics, technol-
ogists, engineers, etc.) of medium-level and skilled workers are capable to revealing signs of a
critical situation after their occurrence, and workers of the initial level of proficiency are
incapable. Medium-level workers can commit errors on the average not more often once a
month, and skilled workers are not more often once a year. How consideration of the qualifi-
cation level influences on predicted risks to lose object safety for a year and for 10 years?
The results of modeling. For workers of the initial level of proficiency, risks to lose object safety
are near 1 (losses of integrity are inevitable). For workers of medium-level of proficiency, risk
to lose object safety for a year is about 0.007 and for 10 years is about 0.067, and for skilled
Figure 15. Example of residual time and comments.
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workers, risk equals to 0.0006 for a year and 0.0058 for 10 years because of effective monitoring
using RMS possibilities.
Example 5.3.2. We will concentrate on the analysis of errors of skilled workers from the point
of object safety. Raising adequacy of modeling, in addition to initial data of Example 5.3.1, we
will consider that mean recovery time of the lost integrity of object equals to 1 day instead of
10 minutes [10]. What effect may be from risk prediction?
Calculated PDF fragment shows (see Figure 16) that risk to lose object safety increases from
0.0006 (for a year) to 0.0119 (for 20 years). Thus, the calculation from PDF mean time between
neighboring losses of object safety Tmean equals to 493 years. That is, the frequency λ = 1/ Tmean
of system safety losses is about 0.002 times a year. It is 6000 times less (!) in comparison with a
primary frequency of occurrence of the latent or obvious threats (once a month). And, esti-
mated Tmean is almost 500 times more in comparison with a primary mean time between errors
of skilled workers (once a year). And, such effect can be reached at the expense of undertaken
control measures, monitoring, and system recovering in case of revealing in time the signs of
threat development. To the point, the frequency λ of system safety losses is extracted latent
knowledge from PDF, built in a calculated form.
If to compare with exponential approximation of PDF with the same frequency λ, the risk to
lose object safety will grow from level 0.002 (for a year) to 0.04 (for 20 years). These are also
extracted latent knowledge considering Taylor’s expansion R(t, λ) ≈ λ∙t (see Section 2). Differ-
ence is in 3.3–3.4 times more against adequate PDF. To feel, it is enough to ascertain that for
created PDF the border of admissible risk 0.002 will be reached for 3 years, not for 1 year as for
exponential PDF. That is, the real duration of effective object operation (i.e., without losses of
safety) is three times more!
Figure 16. Calculated PDF fragment for Example 5.3.2.
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Example 5.3.3. This allowed to estimate operation of object as “black box,” described by
characteristics of skilled workers. On dangerous manufacture critical operations are carried
out by skilled workers in interaction with RMS (including reservation and supports of
another). Formally, they operate as parallel elements with hot reservation. Thereby, the consid-
eration of such interaction allows to increase adequacy of modeling. Let’s estimate risk to lose
object safety for this variant (all input data for each from two parallel elements are the same
that in Example 5.3.2).
Calculated PDF fragment shows (see Figure 17) that risk to lose object safety increases from
0.0000003 (for a year) to 0.00014 (for 20 years). Thus, the mean time between neighboring
losses of object safety Tmean, calculated from known PDF, equals to 663 years. That is, the
frequency λ of system safety losses is about 0.0015 times a year. It is 8000 times less (!) in
comparison with a primary frequency of occurrence of the latent or obvious threats (once a
month). And, at the expense of reservation estimated, Tmean is 34.5% longer in comparison
with Tmean from Example 5.3.2.
If to compare with exponential approximation of PDF with the same frequency λ, the risk to
lose object safety will grow from level 0.0015 (for a year) to 0.03 (for 20 years). Difference is in
200–5000 times more against adequate PDF. The border of admissible risk 0.0015 will be
reached for 195 years, not for 1.3 year as for exponential PDF. That is, the real duration of
effective object operation (i.e., without losses of safety) is 150 times more! Such effect can be
reached at the expense of mutual aid (reservation and supports) of skilled workers using RMS.
Example 5.3.4. Come back to the SUEK value chain (see Figure 10). According to system
engineering principles (see ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and Figure 1), we decompose logically this
chain into nine serial components. Components from 1 to 6 are united by MFSS of mine,
component 7 is associated with washing factory, component 8 is associated with transport,
component 9 is associated with port (see Figure 18). For every element of this chain, a specific
Figure 17. Calculated PDF fragment for Example 5.3.3.
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set of threats exists. Let us analyze a system of such value chain. The typical systems of this
value chain, including MFSS, are:
1. The control system of ventilation and local airing equipment.
2. The system of modular decontamination equipment and compressed air control.
3. The system of air and gas control.
4. The system of air dust content control.
5. The system of dynamic phenomena control and forecasting.
6. The system of fire prevention protection.
7. The safety system of washing factory.
8. The safety system for transport.
9. The safety system of port.
What about the safety for analyzed value chain for existing threats considering possibilities of
remote monitoring systems (RMS), covering all components of chain?
Let’s put that the workers, interacted with RMS, participate in each chain process. Their
activity is modeled by the models of Section 3, considering examples above. The high ade-
quacy is reached by decomposition of chain system to nine logical subsystems, each of which
Figure 18. Illustration of system, combined from parallel and series subsystems.
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implements corresponding typical functions of Systems 1–9. Safety of whole value chain
system is provided, if “AND” the first subsystem, “AND” the second,…, and “AND” the ninth
subsystem safety are provided (see Figure 18). Reservation of elements for every subsystem is
explained by RMS possibilities. Those input data for every element are the same as in Example
5.3.3.
Calculated PDF fragment shows (see Figure 19) that risk to lose safety increases from 0.000003
(for a year) to 0.0013 (for 20 years). Thus, the mean time between neighboring losses of safety
Tmean equals to 283 years. That is, the frequency λ of system safety losses is about 0.0035 times
a year. It is 2.3 times more often against the results of Example 5.3.3. In comparison with a
primary frequency of occurrence of the latent or obvious threats (once a month), the frequency
λ is 3430 times lower!
For exponential approximation of PDF with the same frequency λ, the risk to lose safety will
grow from level 0.0035 (for a year) to 0.07 (for 20 years). Difference is in 54–1167 times more
against adequate PDF.
The border of admissible risk 0.002 will be reached for 24 years, not for 7 months as for
exponential PDF (see Section 2). That is, the real duration of effective operation (i.e., without
losses of safety) is 41 times more!
Example 5.3.5. Howmuch risks will increase, if in a system of value chain from Example 5.3.4
only medium-level workers are used?
Calculated PDF fragment shows (see Figure 20) that risk to lose safety increases from 0.0009
(for a year) to 0.25 (for 20 years). Thus, the mean time between neighboring losses of safety
Tmean equals to 24 years. That is, the frequency λ of system safety losses is about 0.04 times a
year. It is 11.4 times less often against the results of Example 4 for skilled workers. In
Figure 19. Calculated PDF fragment for Example 5.3.4.
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comparison with a primary frequency of occurrence of the latent or obvious threats (once a
month), the frequency λ is 21 times lower!
For exponential approximation of PDF with the same frequency λ, the risk to lose safety will
grow from level 0.04 (for a year) to 0.55 (for 20 years). Difference is 2.2–44.4 times more against
adequate PDF. The border of admissible risk 0.002 will be reached for 2 years, not for one
month as for exponential PDF. That is, the real duration of effective operation (i.e., without
losses of safety) is 24 times more!
6. Instead of conclusion
The proposed probabilistic methods help the system using “smart systems”:
• To predict risks to lose integrity for complex structures on the given prognostic time
• To rationale of preventive measures considering admissible risk
• To estimate “smart system” operation quality
• To predict in real time the mean residual time before the next parameter abnormalities
The algorithm of creating more adequate PDF of time between losses of system integrity,
considering for every element different threats, possibilities of control, monitoring, and recov-
ery, allows to improve accuracy of probability predictions in hundred-thousand times (!) in
comparison with exponential approximation.
The purposed approach allows to improve existing risk control concept, including creation
and perfection of probabilistic models for problem decision, automatic combination, and
generation of new probabilistic models, forming the storehouse of risk prediction knowledge;
for storehouse, dozens of variants of the decision of typical industrial problems for risk control.
Figure 20. Calculated PDF fragment for Example 5.3.5.
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The application of the methods and technologies by the joint-stock company “Siberian Coal
Energy Company,” implemented on the level of the remote monitoring systems, allowed to
rethink system possibilities for increasing reliability and industrial safety, improve
multifunctional safety systems, decrease risks, and provide predictive maintenance and oper-
ation efficiency in company value chain.
Author details
Vladimir Artemyev1, Jury Rudenko1 and George Nistratov2*
*Address all correspondence to: george.icie@gmail.com
1 JSC “SUEK”, Moscow, Russia
2 Scientific Research Institute of Applied Mathematics and Certification, Moscow, Russia
References
[1] Feller W. An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications. Vol. II. Willy; 1971
[2] Kostogryzov A, Nistratov G. Standardization, mathematical modeling, rational manage-
ment and certification in the field of system and software engineering, Moscow. Arma-
ment Policy Conversion. 2004. 395 p
[3] Kostogryzov AI, Stepanov PV. Innovative management of quality and risks in systems life
cycle, Moscow. Armament Policy Conversion. 2008. 404p. (in Russian)
[4] Zio E. An introduction to the basics of reliability and risk analysis. World Scientific. 2006.
222 p
[5] Kostogryzov A, Nistratov A, Nistratov G. Applicable technologies to forecast, analyze
and optimize reliability and risks for complex systems. Proceedings of the 6st Interna-
tional Summer Safety and Reliability Seminar, Poland. September 2012;3(1):1-14
[6] Kostogryzov A, Nistratov G, Nistratov A. Some Applicable Methods to Analyze and Opti-
mize System Processes in Quality Management. Total Quality Management and Six Sigma:
InTech. 2012. pp. 127-196. Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/total-quality--
management-and-six-sigma/some-applicable-methods-to-analyze-and-optimize-system-pro-
cesses-in-quality-management
[7] Kostogryzov A, Grigoriev L, Nistratov G, Nistratov A, Krylov V. Prediction and optimi-
zation of system quality and risks on the base of modeling processes. American Journal of
Operations Research, Special Issue;3(1A):217-244
[8] January 2013, Available from: http://www.scirp.org/journal/ajor/
Probabilistic Methods and Technologies of Risk Prediction and Rationale of Preventive Measures by Using…
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75109
49
[9] Kostogryzov A, Nistratov G, Nistratov A. The innovative probability models and soft-
ware Technologies of Risks Prediction for systems operating in various fields. Interna-
tional Journal of Engineering and Innovative Technology (IJEIT). September 2013;3(3):146-
155. http://www.ijeit.com/archive.php
[10] Kostogryzov AI et al. Security of Russia. Legal, Social&Economic and Scientific & Engi-
neering Aspects. The Scientific Foundations of Technogenic Safety. Machutov N, editor.
Moscow, Znanie. 2015. 936 p
[11] Kostogryzov AI, Kosterenko VN, Timchenko AN, Artemyev VB. Osnovy protivoa-
variynoy ustoychivosty ugolnych predprijatiy (The Foundations of Counteremergency
Stability for Coal Enterprises). V. 6 “Industrial safety”. Book 11. - Moscow: “Gornoje delo”
Kimmerijsky Center Ltd. – 336 p
[12] Kostogryzov AI, Stepanov PV, Nistratov GA, Nistratov AA, Grigoriev LI, Atakishchev OI.
Innovative management based on risks prediction. In: Zheng, editor. Information Engi-
neering and Education Science. London: Taylor & Francis Group; 2015. pp. 159-166. ISBN
978-1-138-02655-1
[13] Kostogryzov A, Stepanov P, Nistratov A, Nistratov G, Zubarev I, Grigoriev L. Analytical
modeling operation processes of composed and integrated information systems on the
principles of system engineering. Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association.
Summer Safety and Reliability Seminars. 2016;7(1):157-166. Available from: http://jpsra.
am.gdynia.pl/archives/jpsra-2016-contents/
[14] Artemyev V, Kostogryzov A, Rudenko J, Kurpatov O, Nistratov G, Nistratov A. Probabi-
listic methods of estimating the mean residual time before the next parameters abnormal-
ities for monitored critical systems. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
System Reliability and Safety (ICSRS- 2017), Milan, Italy, pp. 368-373
[15] Svetlana J, Tatiana K, Andrey K, Oleg K, Andrey N, George N. The probabilistic analysis
of the remote monitoring systems of critical infrastructure safety. Journal of Polish Safety
and Reliability Association. Summer Safety and Reliability Seminars. 2017;8(1):183-188.
http://jpsra.am.gdynia.pl/archives/jpsra-2017-contents/
[16] Andrey K, Oleg A, Pavel S, George N, Andrey N, Leonid G. Probabilistic modelling
processes of mutual monitoring operators actions for transport systems. Proceedings of
the 4th International Conference on Transportation Information and Safety, ICTIS 2017.
pp. 865-871
[17] Kostogryzov A, Stepanov P, Grigoriev L, Atakishchev O, Nistratov A, Nistratov G.
Improvement of Existing Risks Control Concept for Complex Systems by the Automatic
Combination and Generation of Probabilistic Models and Forming the Storehouse of
Risks Predictions Knowledge. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
Applied Mathematics, Simulation and Modelling (AMSM 2017), August 6–7, Phuket,
Thailand. DEStech Publications, Inc. pp. 279-283
[18] ISO 17359. Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines - General guidelines
Probabilistic Modeling in System Engineering50
[19] ISO 13381–1. Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines - Prognostics - Part 1:
General guidelines
[20] ISO 13379. Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines - General guidelines on
data interpretation and diagnostics techniques
[21] IEC 61508–1. Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems— Part 1: General requirements
Probabilistic Methods and Technologies of Risk Prediction and Rationale of Preventive Measures by Using…
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75109
51

